In this paper we present a new lattice construction for a lattice based partial key exposure attack for the RSA cryptography. We consider the situation that the RSA secret key d is small and a sufficient amount of the LSBs (least significant bits) of d are known by the attacker. We show that our lattice construction is theoretically more efficient than known attacks proposed in [1, 6] .
Introduction
In this paper we present a new lattice construction for a lattice based partial key exposure attack for the RSA cryptography in the situation that the secret key d is small and its LSBs (least significant bits) are exposed.
Boneh and Durfee [1] proposed the lattice based attack for the RSA cryptography. Its basic idea is to reduce the RSA key finding problem to problems of finding small roots of modular equations such as f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ≡ 0 (mod W ), which are solved by the Coppersmith technique [5] , the technique that solves a given modular equation by converting it to an ordinary equation by using a lattice basis reduction algorithm such as the LLL algorithm [9] . Boneh and Durfee [1] showed that the secret key d can be obtained from a public key pair e and N in polynomial time in log N when d < N 0.292 .
Since Boneh and Durfee's work, many of its variants have been proposed [3, 6] . Blömer and May [3] extended the technique for a partial key exposure attack, i.e., a problem of computing d from e, N and some partial information on d. This approach has been further extended by Ernst et al. [6] for several partial key exposure situations. In this paper we consider one of those situations where the secret key d is small and some LSBs of d are given (besides e and N ), and we show some improvement over the algorithm by Ernst et al., thereby solving an open problem raised in [6] .
In order to state our improvement we need some notations; see the next section for the precise definition. Let (e, N ) be an RSA public key pair and let d be its corresponding secret key. Here as usual we use N = (the bit-length of N ) as a security parameter. We consider the situation that d = (the bit length of d) is relatively small compared with N and some 0 least significant bits of d are known. Let β = d / N and δ = ( d − 0 )/ N ; that is, they are respectively the ratios of the bit-length of d and its unknown part. Now the asymptotic performance of the algorithms in [1, 6] can be summarized in Figure 1 . (This figure is a rough image, not accurate.)
The algorithm of [1] works asymptotically when the parameters take values in the left of a vertical line labelled "β = 0.292". That is, it obtains the secret key for β < 1 − 1 √ 2 = 0.292... and any δ. The algorithm of [6] works when
That is it works when β and δ take values in the left/above of a curve labelled Ernst et al.
.
As shown in the Figure 1 , the algorithm of [6] improves the solvable parameter range when δ is small; it has been however left open [6] to develop an algorithm that has a better solvable parameter range than both [1] and [6] . In this paper we propose an algorithm that can work asymptotically when the parameters take values in the left/above of the dashed line of Figure 
Note that the range (3) is our new improvement which is the left/above of the dashed line Ours 1 in Figure 1 , while the range (4) is already given by [6] . Also as shown in Section 5, compared with the construction of [6] , our lattice construction produces a much smaller instance for a lattice basis reduction algorithm, which improves the total running time significantly. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some notations and lemmas about the lattice based partial key exposure attack. Section 3 provides the overview of the lattice based partial key exposure attack. In Section 4 we describe the construction and the performance of our lattice. Section 5 provides the results of our computer experiments. The analysis of Section 4 is explained in the Appendix section.
Preliminaries
We introduce some notations and state some known facts used in the following discussions. Then we review some key technical lemmas used in the lattice based attack.
We use standard RSA notations throughout this paper. A given RSA instance is defined by p, q, e, and d, where p and q are large primes, e is a public key, and d is a secret key. Let N = p × q, and let ϕ(N ) be the Euler's function; here we may simplify assume that ϕ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1). The key relation is ed ≡ 1 (mod ϕ(N )).
The partial key exposure attack is to compute the secret key d from partial information on d, and the public key (e, N ). In this paper, we consider the situation that some LSBs of d are exposed, that is, recovering d from LSBs of d (together with e and N ). We use d 0 to denote the exposed part andd to denote the non-exposed part. That is, we assume that
where M = 2 k and k = lg(d 0 ) 1 . We will use M for denoting this number throughout this paper. Define β = log N d and δ = log Nd . That is, β and δ are the rough ratios of the bit-length of d and d relative to that of N respectively. In our algorithm, we need to solve some modular equations such as f (x, y) ≡ 0 (mod W ) for some polynomials f (x, y). Furthermore, we want to obtain solutions in a certain range. In general, this task is not easy. However there are some cases where we may be able to use the standard numerical method for solving these modular equations. The Howgrave-Graham lemma provides us with one of such cases.
In order to state the Howgrave-Graham Lemma, we introduce the following norm defined by any given non-negative integers X and Y , which we call in this paper "XY -norm." Definition 1. XY -norm Let X and Y be natural numbers and f (x, y) = i,j a i,j x i y j be a polynomial with integral coefficient.
We define the XY -norm of f (x, y) by
Lemma 1. (Howgrave-Graham [7])
For any positive integers X, Y and W , let f (x, y) be a bivariate polynomial consisting w terms with integral coefficient such that the following holds
Then we have
within the range of |x| < X and |y| < Y .
Note that f (x, y) = 0 clearly implies f (x, y) ≡ 0 (mod W ). What is important is its converse. This lemma guarantees that the solution of f (x, y) ≡ 0 (mod W ) in the target range can be found (if exists) from the solutions of f (x, y) = 0, which can be obtained by the standard numerical method.
In order to use the above lemma, we need to obtain polynomials with a small XY -norm. The key idea of the lattice based attack is to formulate this task as the shortest vector problem and use an approximate solution computed by a polynomial time lattice basis reduction algorithm for the shortest vector problem.
We introduce some definitions and some lemmas about the lattice. Consider linearly independent vectors b 1 , . . . , b n ∈ Rñ, then the lattice with basis b 1 , . . . , b n is defined by
That is, the lattice is an integral linear combination of its basis vectors. We denote by n a number of vectors, which is usually called lattice dimension, and denote byñ a number of component of vector in basis, which we call lattice component size. Note that the lattice is a additive subgroup of Rñ. The shortest vector problem, for given basis b 1 , . . . , b n , is to find a vector v such that
That is, this problem is to find a non-zero vector having the minimum length in L(b 1 , . . . , b n ). In order to obtain polynomials with small XY -norms, we need to compute short vectors as an approximate solution of this problem. We will use a polynomial time algorithm, named LLL, proposed in [9] . Some improvements have been proposed [11, 12] , but as shown later, these improvements are not essential for our application.
The approximation ratio of the LLL algorithm is exponential, it is however enough for our propose. The following theorem guarantees an upper bound of the length of a vector computed by the LLL algorithm. The LLL algorithm computes a special basis v 1 , . . . , v n , named reduced basis, from given basis b 1 , . . . , b n . Our interest is short vectors in the reduced basis in the following theorem. 
Here, L is the lattice with basis b 1 , . . . , b n , and det(L) is the determinant of the lattice defined by
b * 1 , . . . , b * n is the Gram-Schmidt orthogonal basis of given basis.
We will use (9) to evaluate the determinant of our lattice in the later section. Note that the shortest vector problem is defined on vectors, while our targets are polynomials. Thus we consider some way to map polynomials to vectors. We consider some natural and simple mapping; For example, a polynomial f (x, y) = −3x 3 + 4x 2 y − 2xy 2 + 7xy 3 is mapped to a vector (−3X 3 , 4X 2 Y, −2XY 2 , 7XY 3 ) by some natural numbers X and Y . To state this correspondence formally, we first need to fix some linear ordering on pairs (i, j) of nonnegative integers. With respect to this ordering let (i(t),j(t)) denote the t-th pair. Then our correspondence between polynomials and vectors is define as follows. Definition 2. Polynomials ↔ vectors Let J be a sequence of pairs of nonnegative integers, where we assume some linear order on J, let it be fixed, and letñ denote |J|, the length of the sequence. We also fix some positive integers X and Y . W.r.t. these X and Y , for any f (x, y) = 1≤t≤ñ a i(t),j(t) x i(t) y j(t) , the following vector b is the vectorisation of f (x, y) with parameter X and Y , and it is denoted by V J (f ; X, Y ).
On the other hand, for any b of sizeñ, a polynomial f (x, y) defined from b by interpreting it as below is called the functionalisation of b and it is denoted by F J (b; X, Y ).
Remark
When J is clear from the context, we often omit J and write as V(f ; X, Y ) and F(b; X, Y ). Then from the definition, the following relationships are immediate.
Overview of the Partial key Exposure Attack
We give an overview of the lattice based partial key exposure attack in the situation that LSBs of d are exposed. The goal of the attack is to compute a secret key d from d 0 , least significant bits of d, and the public key pair. The lattice based attack achieves this goal by using a lattice reduction algorithm and Howgrave-Graham's lemma. It is said [6] (and some papers) that this attack is effective if (i) d, and unknown part of d are short, (ii) e and N are of similar bit length, and (iii) p and q are of similar bit length.
In order to be precede, we consider in this paper, the following conditions.
(a) δ = log Nd is smaller than 0.5 (b) lg(e) = lg(N ), and (c) lg(p) = lg(q)
In the following, we assume all parameters satisfy these conditions. More precisely, we will use the following inequalities in the later.
e < ϕ(N ) and p
Our objective is to compute d from a public key pair (e, N ) and d 0 . As explained in Introduction, the key relation is the modular equation (5), from which it is easy to derive
for some x, y ∈ Z. Also by using (6), we can deduce from the above that e(d·M +d 0 ) = 1−x(y +N ) and hence we have
We show here that it is relatively easy to enumerate all solutions (x, y) of (12) . First note that a solution (x, y) exists if for integer y,
In fact in this case, we can compute x by
But clearly what we need is some specific solution of (12) . Among solutions (x, y) of (12), we say that (x 0 , y 0 ) is useful if it indeed satisfies the following equation, from which we can recover the secret key.
Thus, our task is not computing some solutions (x, y), but computing this useful solution among (x, y) satisfying (12) . Below we use (x 0 , y 0 ) to denote this useful solution. Let us consider a size of the useful solution (x 0 , y 0 ). We have the following upper bounds. Here, we use (11) and the fact that ϕ(N ) = N + y 0 if (x 0 , y 0 ) is the useful solution.
and
Now let X = N β and Y = 3N 0.5 . Then, the useful solution (x 0 , y 0 ) is a solution of (12) satisfying |x 0 | < X and |y 0 | < Y . Conversely, we consider some heuristic condition on δ for a solution satisfying |x| < X and |y| < Y is useful. We assume that solutions of (12) are random numbers on {0, . . . , eM − 1} 2 . Since the number of solution pairs of (12) is smaller than eM , we expect the number of solutions satisfy |x| < X and |y| < Y is smaller than
Thus, if this value is smaller than 1, we may expect a solution within the range |X| < N β and |y| < N 0.5 is only one, which is the useful solution guaranteed by (14) . From this observation we propose a condition δ < 0.5 and the following heuristic assumption.
Heuristic Assumption Consider the case δ < 0.5. Then, there is only useful solution (x 0 , y 0 ) within the range of |x 0 | < N β , |y 0 | < 3N 0.5 of the following equation.
Furthermore we can recover the secret key d by (13) 2 .
Remark. This assumption shows we can obtain the secret key by the exhaustive search when δ < 0.5.
1. Based on f main (x, y) (and f M (x, y)), define a certain family of polynomials
(Here m and n are some algorithm parameter defined later. For our discussion, let us define the following two functions 3
f main (x, y) is the left-hand side of equation (12) . The motivation of f M (x, y) will be explained later; here we only point out that f M (x 0 , y 0 ) ≡ 0 (mod eM ), where (x 0 , y 0 ) is a useful solution.
Now we summarise the above explanation. Our technical goal is to obtain the useful (x 0 , y 0 ) satisfying (12) , in other words, a pair satisfying both f main (x 0 , y 0 ) ≡ 0 (mod eM ) and |x 0 | < N β and |y 0 | < 3N 0.5 . For achieving this technical goal by solving the mod equation, we make use of Howgrave-Graham Lemma, and for this purpose, we modify f main (x, y) to some family of functions with small XY -norm. The task of defining these polynomials is formulated as the shortest vector problem, and known polynomial time algorithm such as the LLL algorithm is used. This is the rough sketch of the lattice based attack. The outline of our algorithm is stated as Figure 2 .
Some remarks may be necessary. Note first that m and n are algorithmic parameters; m is chosen appropriately and n is the number of polynomials h a (x, y) that is also determined appropriately based on m.
Secondly note that we have the following relation between these polynomials.
The key point of (17) Hence we can obtain the useful solution from computing all solutions of g 1 (x, y) = g 2 (x, y) = 0 by some numerical method if exists.
By (8) and (10), we have
Since the second bound is larger, we obtain the following sufficient condition for using HowgraveGraham's lemma:
We modify (18) to a more simple approximate bound. First we note that the factor 2 n/2 and √ w (=Θ( √ n)) are negligible. Then we have a condition det(L) 1/(n−1) < (eM ) m instead of (18). Next we neglect the difference between det(L) 1/(n−1) and det(L) 1/n . Thus, instead of using the condition (18), we will use the following one.
For example, when attacking 1024-bit RSA instances by using lattices having dimension n ≈ 100, we may have (eM ) m > 2 10000 whereas 2 n/2 · √ w ≈ 2 50 , and the ratio det(
Now our goal is to construct a lattice satisfying (19), and we will show in the next section that it is possible if β and δ satisfies the condition (3) given in Introduction.
Our Construction
In this section, we explain our construction and a main result. A difference between former algorithm and ours is only lattice construction satisfying (19). We will give its analysis in the Appendix.
Let β and δ be assumed bounds defined above, m be an algorithm parameter introduced in the above outline, τ be a parameter used to optimise the bounds by β and δ. We fix them throughout this section. We introduce index series I a (m, τ, β, δ) for constructing our lattice L(m, τ, β, δ). Definition 3. We define our sequence I 1 (m, τ, β, δ), I 2 (m, τ, β, δ) and I 3 (m, τ, β, δ) (In short, I 1 , I 2 and I 3 respectively). Here we set
We consider the order ≺ in I 1 , I 2 and I 3 by the lexicographic order of (i, j) 4 . Then we define index sequence I(m, τ, β, δ) by concatenating I 1 , I 2 and I 3 . That is, order of elements in I is defined as follows for (i, j) ∈ I k and (i , j
We define our polynomials f i,j (x, y) to construct our lattice (this is h c (x, y) in the outline).
Definition 4.
Then we define a sequence J(m, τ, β, δ) = {(i , j )|a monomial x i y j is appeared in some f i,j (x, y)} where we assume the standard lexicographic order in J(m, τ, β, δ). We simplify denote this by J.
It is clear that
The number of polynomials |I| is just n in Figure 2 . Note also that |J| =ñ, the number of components of each vector b i,j is O(|I|) since we can rewrite a set J by
Hence |I| and |J| has a same order Θ(m 2 ).
By using these polynomials and indecies, we define our lattice L(m, τ, β, δ) by
Here (i 1 , j 1 ), . . . , (i n , j n ) are index sequence in I and 
Here b *
We give the proof of these bounds in the Appendix. (Lemma 3, Lemma 4 and Lemma 5). Now we assume that these bounds hold, and we introduce an "evaluator" for deciding suitable τ . The evaluator eval(i, j) for b * i,j is defined by
We define the evaluator for any index sequence K by
Then we can state the condition (19) in terms of eval.
Lemma 2.
For any index sequence I satisfying
the condition (19) holds.
Proof. By (9) and the definition of the evaluator, we have
Thus, (24) is equivalent to det(L) < (eM ) |I|·m . Which is indeed the condition (19).
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Thus, we use eval(I) < 0 as our (approximate) sufficient condition that the lattice based attack (under our construction of the lattice L) breaks a given RSA instance. Note that this condition is based on our heuristic assumption and it is only an approximate condition because of the approximation of (18) by (19); yet further approximation is used below for estimating eval. This means that the condition for parameters β and δ we will derive below is, strictly speaking, not accurate nevertheless, we will argue by using our approximation for avoiding unnecessary complications. Justification of our approximation analysis and together with our heuristic assumption will be given by computer experiments shown later. Now by using the bound (21) (see Proposition 1 in Section A.1), we can approximately evaluate eval(i, j) as follows 5 .
From this we can approximately estimate eval(I). From some calculation (see Section A.2) we have
for 1 − 2β − τ > 0, and we have 
where its left-hand side is minimised when τ takes value τ 0 = 2(1 − 2β)(β − δ). Hence, substituting this to (27), we have
This is equivalent to (3). Next we consider the case of 1 − 2β − τ ≤ 0. Again assuming m is sufficiently large, we have the following approximate condition (24).
By similar argument, we substitute τ 1 =
1−2δ 2
to τ for minimising (29), and derive the following condition (29). This is equivalent to the condition proposed by [6] . Therefore, we can recover the secret key of RSA in polynomial time in log N when β and δ satisfies (3) or (4).
Computer Experiments
We carried out our preliminary computer experiments to check that our approach works and estimate its efficiency. We conducted our computer experiments on the TSUBAME supercomputer 6 with C++ implementation using the NTL library [10] . We use the L 2 algorithm [11, 12] for lattice basis reduction.
The procedure of our experiments is shown in Figure 3 . The algorithm part is essentially the same as the one outlined in Figure 2 for the parameters m and n, and see Section 3 for the parameters β and δ.) A word "dim." means the lattice dimension in experiments, i.e., n = |I| in our construction. By "total CPU time" and "L 2 time" we mean the time of Step 2 through Step 5 and that of Step 3 respectively. Recall that the lattice component size is bounded by a constant time of the lattice dimension.
Results are in Table 1 and Table 2 . Table 1 shows the qualities of our lattices, that is, whether the experiment is succeeded or not, for these parameters. On the other hand, Table 2 shows the computational time of our experiments for various and m, and fixed β and δ.
Quality of Lattice
For checking our approach indeed works and estimating the quality of our lattice construction, we carried out our preliminary computer experiments.
Note first that the bounds (3) and (4) are the ideal ones obtained by the asymptotic analysis assuming m is sufficiently large. For each given value of m, we can determine the range of β and δ satisfying eval (I(m, τ 0 , β, δ) ) < 0 by numerically analyzing the original expressions (i.e., (42) ∼ (44) of Appendix A.2). Figure 4 shows the bounds of β and δ obtained in this way for some m Figure 4 : Our recoverable range for many m values, and the theoretical limit of our construction (3) and that of [6] 's construction (2) . It can be seen that these bounds get close to our ideal bound when m gets large. We focus on the range of 0.28 ≤ β ≤ 0.32 and 0 ≤ ratio ≤ 0.2, mainly our new improvement area.
Our computer experiments are summarized in Figure 5 , which are for the cases m = 10 and 14. The instance size (= lg(N )) is 1024 for both cases; since these are still preliminary ones, we conducted only one execution for each instance. Note that a shade area in each figure is the area that eval(I(m, τ 0 , β, δ)) < 0 obtained numerically for each m. A black circle (resp., a white circle) indicates the parameter (β, δ) (or the point (β, (β − δ)/β)) that the experiment succeeds (resp., fails). Those results are shown in detail in Table 1 . The word "no(1)" in the column "success" in the tables means g 1 (x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 whereas g 2 (x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 at the Step 5. In this case we may expect to get the correct solution by generating enough number of polynomials g by changing X and Y randomly within the same bit length. On the other hand, the word "no(0)" means that g 1 (x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 and g 2 (x 0 , y 0 ) = 0 at Step 5, which we regarded as a failure.
Computational Time
Next we examine the efficiency of our algorithm based on our experiments. As seen by our analysis and experiments, the algorithm shows better performance by using large m. On the other hand, by using larger m, the lattice dimension also get larger. More specifically, the lattice dimension is Θ(m 2 ) by our construction. We examine how this indeed effects to the running time of the algorithm. (Cf. The lattice dimension of those used in [6] is Θ(m 3 ).)
We carried out computer experiments with parameters (β, δ) = (0.3, 0.225) and (β, δ) = (0.4, 0.12), whereas parameters m and are chosen as m = 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12, and = 512, 1024, and 2048. Table 2 is experiments for = 512, 1024, and 2048. Total CPU time and L 2 time in these tables are the average running time of five executions. Notice that all experiments in Table 2 It should be noted that the construction of [6] yields a lattice of dimension Θ(m 3 ) and that it took about five hours on average (according to our experiments) to solve the instances obtained by this construction for m = 6.
Conclusion
We gave a new lattice construction for the lattice based attack for the RSA cryptography in the situation that d is small and LSBs of d is exposed. By this construction, the theoretical recoverable range has been improved as shown in Figure 1 , which solves the open problem raised in [6] . Also as shown by our preliminary experimental results, the total efficiency of the lattice based attack has been improved significantly compared with [6] . Some more improvement, however, is necessary for using this technique with large m. One possibility is to make use of parallelization for processing the lattice basis reduction algorithm. From a theoretical view point, it would be interesting if we can understand the limitation of this approach. 
A Appendix: Analysis
This section provides the precise analysis for some results in Section 4. Our objective is to derive our theoretical recoverable limit of our construction
In order to obtain these inequalities, we first prove the approximated estimation
in Section A.1. Next in Section A.2 we explain the way to derive our theoretical limit. We fix algorithm parameters and RSA instances throughout this section, and denote
A.1 Approximating the Evaluator
We first compute the exact value of |b * i,j | for (i, j) ∈ I 1 and I 2 in Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 respectively. Next we consider the bound for |b * i,j | for (i, j) ∈ I 3 in Lemma 5. Then we estimate the approximated value of eval(i, j)
Lemma 3. For any (i, j) ∈ I 1 , we have
Proof. We in fact prove that
by mathematical induction on (i, j). That is, b * i,j is the vectorisation of (eM ) m−j X i Y j . We first recall that b * i,j is defined by
where the order ≺ is defined in Section 4. Consider the base case, i.e. the case (i, j) = (0, 0), we have
Now we assume that (33) holds for (i , j ) ≺ (i, j). Then we have for (i, j) ∈ I 1 with some constants α,
We consider the vectorisation of (34), we have
Here we use the assumption of induction
Substituting this to (35) we have
We can prove the next lemma by a similar way to lemma 3.
Lemma 4.
For any (i, j) ∈ I 2 , we have
The evaluation of |b * i,j | for (i, j) ∈ I 3 is a bit involved. Our objective is to show the following lemma.
Lemma 5. For any (i, j) ∈ I 3 , we have
Now we start with the following two simple lemmas. Lemma 7. For any positive integers i and j such that XY > 2i, we have
Proof. This is derived as follows. 
||(−1 + xy)

Proof.
We prove that for any s ≥ 1, the equation ( 
